Will Trump Follow Through on Gaza?

Implementation of week two of the Israel-Hamas cease-fire deal has gone according to plan, more or less. But anyone who seriously believes that there’s smooth sailing ahead for the three-phased accord should lay down and wait quietly until the feeling passes.

This isn’t an agreement between the United States and Switzerland. It’s the grudging result of 15 months of bitter, bloody conflict between two combatants seemingly pledged to the other’s destruction. One of those parties—Hamas—engaged in the willful and indiscriminate killing of civilians; serial sexual violence; the taking of hostages; and is designated by the agreement’s principal mediator as a foreign terror organization. The other—Israel, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose overriding goal is to stay in power—would prefer the war in Gaza continue, and thus is in no hurry to reach the agreement’s second stage, which imagines the end of the war and the withdrawal of Israeli forces.

The implementation process is literally week by week, and much might disrupt it. That said, perhaps the most likely outcome will be the successful completion of the first phase, with its exchange of hostages for Palestinian prisoners. The agreement compels both parties to respect the cease-fire so long as negotiations on the second phase continue. And few will be surprised if both sides drag these on well beyond the initial six weeks designated for the first phase. Indeed, the negotiators’ logic is that after six weeks of quiet, both sides, perhaps under public pressure, will find it much harder to return to battle. Hovering over this unwieldy enterprise is newly minted U.S. President Donald Trump who, having claimed credit for the accord’s success, now owns it. It remains to be seen just how much currency he’s prepared to spend to keep it alive and how concerned he is about the real possibility that his first preinaugural foreign-policy success might crater on his watch.

Phased deals are always inherently risky, especially between two parties who view their conflict in near existential terms. It would have seemed much simpler to implement an all-for-all negotiation, speeding up the timeline with Israel getting all the hostages back in exchange for the release of thousands of Palestinian prisoners and the end of the war in Gaza. But, then again, this is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where anything remotely resembling comprehensive trade-offs goes beyond what either party is prepared to concede. This is especially true on the Israeli side, where domestic politics dominates decision-making and produces risk-aversion, not risk-readiness, particularly when it concerns territory.

The prime example of a phased, conditions-based performance agreement was the Oslo Accords. And those failed, largely because there was no clear-cut end state, and, instead of generating trust and confidence, the gradualist approach created resentment and lack of trust. And if Oslo—which was a genuine breakthrough, complete with signing ceremonies, talk of actual peace, and real respect (even affection) between the negotiators—still failed, one can imagine the challenges to an Israeli-Hamas accord.

The thornier questions are saved for the second phase, which, at its core, will require a vision for the end of the war and Gaza’s future. At present, the two sides have irreconcilable visions for Gaza’s future, with Hamas determined to stay in power and Israel determined to prevent that outcome. Phase two envisions Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, which is difficult to imagine without a robust security architecture and guarantees—which Hamas will work hard to reject. Negotiations in the second phase will also require addressing questions of a political day after in Gaza, which will almost certainly involve some role for the Palestinian Authority (PA), something Netanyahu has adamantly opposed. Phase two depends on agreement from both sides over Gaza’s future: who is in charge politically, what the security architecture looks like, and monitoring of the enclave. At present, these questions seem insurmountable.

Perhaps a different Israeli prime minister—one who is free from the all-consuming need to stay in power and without the threat of being on trial for bribery, fraud, and breach of trust—might have been able to take on an all-for-all approach. But the political laws of gravity that have governed Israel’s negotiating style—need for performance-based implementation, fundamental mistrust of Hamas, and concerns over withdrawal from Gaza that could bring Hamas’s resurgence—would have been more likely pushed in the direction of a phased agreement.

The challenge of phasing is made worse by the Hamas factor, which has shaped Israel’s view of the conflict and now looms over the agreement’s implementation. The Israel-Hamas agreement clearly reflects the hollowness of Netanyahu’s claim of total victory over the group. Hamas has clearly been dealt a mighty blow. Its senior leadership has been killed; its capacity as an organized military force capable of another attack on the level of Oct. 7, 2023, destroyed; its allies (save the Houthis), Hezbollah and Iran, severely weakened. It seems unlikely, even if it wanted to (and it may not), that Hamas can return to governing Gaza as it did between 2007 and 2023. Its popularity has declined among Palestinians in Gaza who wonder what Oct. 7 achieved, other than death and destruction, as well as what Hamas will be able to do to alleviate their suffering and rebuild their homes and lives. And yet, Hamas survives. The cease-fire has enabled it to emerge above ground, bold and brazen, sending its police to maintain order, staffing its ministries, paying salaries, restoring services, and distributing humanitarian assistance. Indeed, recent reporting suggests that, however weakened, Hamas remains “deeply entrenched,” and its hold on power will create challenges for any permanent cease-fire.

At a minimum, should the cease-fire collapse, Hamas will remain an insurgency capable of inflicting casualties on returning Israeli forces. Indeed, former U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said during a recent speech that Hamas has already recruited nearly as many fighters as Israel has taken off the battlefield. And if the cease-fire holds, Hamas plans to wield significant influence in Gaza’s proverbial day after. Given the dysfunction of the Palestinian national movement; the weakness of the corrupt, nepotistic, and authoritarian Mahmoud Abbas-led PA; and the Israeli government’s seeming refusal to engage in post-war planning that might actually empower a new legitimate Palestinian governing structure, Hamas will likely rule by default.

With both Israel and the PA blocking serious post-war planning for Gaza, the Israel-Hamas agreement might actually empower Hamas, facilitating the release of almost 2,000 Palestinian prisoners and ensuring a surge of humanitarian assistance for the first time in 15 months at pre-war levels. Hamas’s visibility on the streets of Gaza will also continue to harden Israeli government positions on getting to a second phase. As Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar asserted last week, the current deal is only for a temporary cease-fire; any permanent end to the war would depend on eliminating any Hamas role and influence in Gaza.

Henry Kissinger once quipped that Israel had no foreign policy, just domestic politics. An exaggeration to be sure, but when applied to the way Netanyahu has handled the post Oct. 7 Israel-Hamas conflict, there is no better analysis. All leaders of democratic societies keep an eye on the rear-view mirror, looking to see where their domestic supporters and opponents are trending. But Netanyahu’s circumstances are unique. On trial for bribery, fraud, and breach of trust for four years running, his political career and potentially his physical freedom compel him to retain power and find some way to beat or undermine his indictment and trial. That means remaining in power, which in turn depends on the support of his right-wing coalition, including two extremist parties—one of which has already withdrawn from the government in protest over the cease-fire deal, and the other threatening to withdraw at the end of the first phase if Netanyahu doesn’t resume the war.

Netanyahu has bribed and pacified these ministers and other coalition members with various benefits: for the religious parties, subsidies for their religious seminaries and legislation to allow them to avoid military duty; and for former National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich settlements, land confiscation and policies that can lay the basis for annexation of the West Bank in everything but name. But, to be clear, like the radical Ben-Gvir and Smotrich, Netanyahu also doesn’t want the war to end completely either. The prime minister fears that if the shooting stops, the focus will turn to his role in the Oct. 7 catastrophe. Indeed, he has done everything in his power to block the formation of a state commission of inquiry and to undermine, if not dislodge, those intelligence and security officials who oppose his wartime policies. There is no obstacle on the Israeli side greater than Netanyahu’s obsession with staying in power and the necessity of catering to his extremist ministers. That dynamic almost certainly prevented a hostage and cease-fire deal from being signed months ago, has constrained the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Gaza, and prevented any serious discussion of post-conflict day-after arrangements in Gaza, especially with regard to a role for the PA. And it has led to a toughening of Israeli policy toward Palestinians on the West Bank and the enabling of settler violence and intimidation there.

Indeed, the recent large-scale operation in Jenin, which might expand to a larger area of the northern West Bank, is partly related to the need to placate members of Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition, who opposed the hostage deal but have declared Trump’s electoral victory as an opportunity to “apply Israeli sovereignty” in the West Bank. A serious explosion in the West Bank has the potential to derail the deal from both sides, creating yet another obstacle to phase two of the deal. As the deal’s implementation moves forward, Israeli politics— particularly pressure from the right to resume the war—will increase. And it is difficult to see how Israel will move from phase one to two with this government. The opposition has offered Netanyahu a safety net to implement the full deal should his coalition break. But this would be a risky move for a prime minister who would then be dependent on adversaries whom he knows would love to see his back.

By all accounts, there’s little doubt that Trump and his Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff played important roles in pressuring both Hamas and Netanyahu, particularly the latter, to accept the agreement. Inauguration Day in the United States and the looming transition from a presidential administration that had no leverage to an incoming one that held important cards, clearly had an impact on Netanyahu, who seemed willing to give Trump a preinaugural win. Whether and how Trump may have sweetened the plot for Netanyahu is unclear. There’s reportedly a letter that contains U.S. assurances that if Hamas fails to hold up its end of the deal, Israel is free to resume the war. In any case, Trump’s unpredictability and clear messaging that he wanted the deal done before he assumed office signaled to Netanyahu that Trump didn’t want Israel to become a problem this early in his second term. And Netanyahu, who’s not quite sure where he stands with Trump and whether he can say no to him the way he rebuffed former U.S. President Joe Biden for months without serious cost, got the message.

Going forward, Trump’s relationship to the agreement has much to do with his broader goals in the region. Much has been made of his interest in broadening the Abraham Accords to include Israeli-Saudi normalization, and even more of the fact that he wants a Nobel Peace Prize. If he’s serious about an Israeli-Saudi deal, all roads will almost certainly lead back to Gaza and well beyond, as the Saudis press Trump and Netanyahu for a commitment to a political horizon involving some sort of two-state solution. This, of course, would set up the possibility of a clash with Netanyahu if the Saudis and Trump demand more of him on the Palestinian issue than his politics will allow.

But that’s a matter for another day. The question now is how much does Trump care about the cease-fire deal and what is he prepared to do to help implement it. Witkoff has been quite expansive in asserting an active U.S. role going forward and is planning a trip to Gaza and the region. Trump, on the other hand, has been decidedly more risk-averse. When asked about implementation recently, Trump responded, “It’s not our war. It’s their war. I am not confident.” Trump can always walk away and blame the collapse on Hamas, and, if necessary, on Israel. And let’s be crystal clear: Trump has a huge agenda, and it’s doubtful that this issue is at the top of his list. Nonetheless, like it or not, the Israel-Hamas deal may well be Trump’s first foreign-policy test. And as a self-proclaimed peacemaker and the world’s greatest negotiator, he doesn’t like to fail.

Can he save the deal if it’s on the cusp of cratering? Can he pressure Netanyahu and Hamas to bend to his will? It’s doubtful that Trump, who fashions himself as the most pro-Israeli president in history, would draw on the levers Biden refused to use in pressuring Netanyahu: restricting U.S. military assistance, criticizing Israel in international fora, or unilaterally recognizing Palestinian statehood. And it may well be that Trump’s bluster is stronger than his bite. But Netanyahu is clearly on edge because of Trump’s unpredictability and clearly doesn’t want to put himself on Trump’s bad side. Unlike with Biden, Netanyahu knows there’s no Republican Party to which he can appeal. Trump is the party now. So a decision point may well be coming. Can Trump succeed in pushing Netanyahu to a second phase, or will he be dragged like Biden into the never-ending labyrinth of Israel-Hamas negotiations? In a matter of weeks, or perhaps sooner, we’re going to find out.