Sanctions still don’t work as intended – nor should we expect them to bring Putin to the table.

Energy News Beat

Estimating Russia’s revenue from oil, gas, and LNG over the last four years (2021–2024) and its share of GDP involves compiling data from available sources, acknowledging gaps, and making reasonable approximations. Below, I provide a year-by-year breakdown of fossil fuel export revenues, federal budget revenues from oil and gas, and their contribution to GDP, based on the most reliable data from web sources and posts on X. Note that precise figures for LNG-specific revenues are often not isolated, so I include them within total fossil fuel revenues where possible. All monetary values are converted to USD for consistency, using approximate exchange rates when necessary. GDP contributions are calculated using reported GDP figures and revenue-to-GDP ratios.

Year-by-Year Revenue and GDP Contribution

2021

Fossil Fuel Export Revenues: Approximately €264 billion (~$312 billion USD, assuming €1 = $1.18).
Federal Budget Oil and Gas Revenue: Contributed 6.8% of GDP, equating to ~35.6% of total budget revenues. Total oil and gas budget revenue was ~$219 billion (16.3 trillion RUB, assuming 1 USD = 74.5 RUB).
GDP: Nominal GDP was ~$1.84 trillion (based on reported PPP adjustments and budget revenue percentages).
Oil and Gas Share of GDP: The oil and gas sector contributed ~15.2% to GDP (including extraction, refining, transport, and related activities). Oil rents alone were 9.67% of GDP.
Notes: High oil prices and stable exports to Europe and Asia boosted revenues. LNG exports were ~40 bcm, contributing ~8% of global LNG supply, but specific LNG revenue is not isolated.

2022

Fossil Fuel Export Revenues: Surged to €356 billion (~$375 billion USD, assuming €1 = $1.05, reflecting a weaker euro).
Federal Budget Oil and Gas Revenue: Contributed nearly 8% of GDP, with total oil and gas revenues reaching 11.6 trillion RUB ($166 billion USD, assuming 1 USD = 70 RUB due to rouble volatility).
GDP: Nominal GDP was ~$1.5 trillion (reported contraction of 2.1%).
Oil and Gas Share of GDP: The sector’s share was ~16.7% (Q2 2024 data suggests continuity, but 2022-specific estimates align here). Oil rents not explicitly reported for 2022, but likely ~9–10% based on prior trends.
Notes: Skyrocketing energy prices post-Ukraine invasion drove record export revenues, despite sanctions. Exports shifted to Asia (China: 47%, India: 37% of crude). LNG revenues remained significant but unsanctioned, with the EU buying 50% of Russia’s LNG.

2023

Fossil Fuel Export Revenues: Dropped to €250 billion (~$270 billion USD, assuming €1 = $1.08).
Federal Budget Oil and Gas Revenue: Fell 24% to 8.8 trillion RUB (~$99.4 billion USD, assuming 1 USD = 88.5 RUB). This was 5.3% of GDP, accounting for 30.9% of budget revenues.
GDP: Nominal GDP grew to ~$1.87 trillion (3.6% growth).
Oil and Gas Share of GDP: Estimated at ~15.2% (consistent with 2020–2024 trends). Total oil and gas rent (formal and informal) estimated at 24% of GDP, though official figures report 15.2%. Oil rents were ~9.7%.
Notes: Western sanctions, including the $60/barrel price cap, reduced revenues. Urals oil averaged $69.1/barrel, above the cap. Exports pivoted further to China and India. LNG exports to the EU continued (50% of total LNG exports).

2024

Fossil Fuel Export Revenues: Estimated at €242 billion (~$260 billion USD, assuming €1 = $1.07).
Federal Budget Oil and Gas Revenue: First half saw 5.698 trillion RUB ($65.12 billion USD, assuming 1 USD = 87.5 RUB), a 41% increase year-on-year. Annual estimate: ~10 trillion RUB ($114 billion USD). Contributed ~6–8% of GDP (extrapolated from 2022’s 8% and 2023’s 5.3%).
GDP: Estimated at ~$2 trillion (based on 2023 growth and projections).
Oil and Gas Share of GDP: Q2 2024 data reports 16.7%, down from 18% in Q1. Annual average likely ~16–17%. Oil rents not reported for 2024, but likely ~9–10% based on prior years.
Notes: Revenues stabilized despite sanctions, with China (43% of exports) and India as key buyers. LNG exports to the EU remained high (49% of total). Mineral Extraction Tax (MET) increases boosted budget revenues.

Total Over Four Years

Total Fossil Fuel Export Revenues (2021–2024): $312B (2021) + $375B (2022) + $270B (2023) + $260B (2024) = ~$1.217 trillion USD.
Total Federal Budget Oil and Gas Revenue: $219B (2021) + $166B (2022) + $99.4B (2023) + $114B (2024) = ~$598.4 billion USD.
Average Oil and Gas Share of GDP: ~15–17% annually (16.9% in 2017, 21.1% in 2018, 19.2% in 2019, 15.2% in 2020, 16.7% in Q2 2024). Weighted average ~16.5%.
Average Oil Rent: ~9.7% of GDP (2021 data; likely similar for 2022–2024).

GDP Contribution as Percentage

Federal Budget Revenue to GDP:
- 2021: 6.8%
- 2022: ~8%
- 2023: 5.3%
- 2024: ~6–8% (estimated)
- Average: ~6.5–7%.
Total Oil and Gas Sector Share of GDP:
- 2021: 15.2%
- 2022: ~16.7%
- 2023: 15.2%
- 2024: 16.7% (Q2)
- Average: ~16–17%.
Oil Rents: ~9–10% of GDP annually.

Notes and Caveats

Data Gaps: LNG-specific revenues are rarely isolated, as most sources aggregate oil, gas, and LNG. Export revenues (€242–356 billion) include coal in some cases, slightly inflating totals.
Exchange Rates: Rouble volatility (70–90 RUB/USD) and euro-dollar fluctuations affect conversions. I used approximate annual averages.
Sanctions Impact: The G7 price cap and EU import bans reduced revenues in 2023–2024, but redirection to Asia mitigated losses.
GDP Estimates: Nominal GDP varies by source ($1.5T in 2022, $2T in 2024). I used consistent figures aligned with revenue reports.
Critical Perspective: Official Russian data (e.g., Rosstat) may underreport the sector’s GDP share (15–17%) compared to informal estimates (24% in 2023). Corporate dividends and indirect revenues are often excluded.

Finance Summary

Russia earned approximately $1.217 trillion USD from fossil fuel exports (oil, gas, LNG) from 2021 to 2024. Federal budget revenues from oil and gas totaled ~$598.4 billion USD, contributing ~6.5–7% of GDP annually. The oil and gas sector accounted for ~16–17% of GDP on average, with oil rents at ~9–10% of GDP.

Some interesting points from Pierre Aury.

Pierre Aury explains why sanctioning Russia is not delivering results.

In January 2023, just after the European Union enacted its ninth sanctions package against Russia, we wrote: “This clearly confirms the fact that sanctions tend not to work to disrupt military operations.”

After nine packages of sanctions, there was no sign of these sanctions having any impact.

Fast forward to May 2025, and the EU has just enacted its 17th sanctions package. 17 packages in 27 months – that is a package every month and a half.

Being so inefficient so consistently over such a long period of time cannot be by chance; it must be by design.

Now, why bring this sanction topic back to the forefront now? It is not only for the pleasure of having fun at the expense of the EU commission but it is because this 17th package is a shipping package. All the others had direct or indirect shipping implications, but this one is targeted mainly at shipping. Shipping appeared first in an EU sanctions package against Russia in the 14^th package which created a blacklist of 27 vessels involved in helping Russia to wage war against Ukraine.

In the 17^th package, the number of ships on that list has grown to 342 after adding 189 new ships on the list. That list is basically the now infamous shadow fleet. Why is it that all these sanctions packages seem not to work in stopping or even slowing down Russia’s military operation in Ukraine? The answer is multiple-fold.

One reason is to be found in the fact that the EU and the US still think that they are the world when they are not anymore. The vast majority of countries in the world are not interested in sanctioning Russia just because the West is telling them to do so. Only 45 countries are sanctioning Russia for its invasion of Ukraine out of a total of 195 in the world. These 45 countries are exclusively in Europe and North America, with the exception of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan in Asia.

The second reason is probably linked to the complete lack of a user guide accompanying the sanctions packages, leaving people willing to abide in the dark as to how practically to follow the EU rules and giving people not willing to abide the excuse that they don’t know practically how to comply.

Another reason can be found in the complete lack of logic of these sanctions. Two examples in shipping: it is perfectly legal to carry Russian oil sold above the price cap from Sakhalin 2 to Japan, the so-called Sakhalin exemption and it is perfectly legal to carry Russian LNG to a European port connected to the European natural gas grid. The reason behind these two exceptions? The inconvenience of having to dispense with Sakhalin oil for Japan and Russian LNG for the EU. Russian nuclear fuel is not covered by any sanctions either. The EU is already working on its next sanctions package – more of the same, expecting a different result.

The bottom line is that the phrase “sanctions won’t work as intended” is a line that Irna Slav, an Energy Writer and author, has coined, and it remains even more apt today. When you combine the extremely ambitious energy policies of the EU and the UK, along with their net-zero requirements for green energy, the only losers will be the consumers in the EU and the UK. The new scope 3 emissions and carbon taxes that they are rolling out will do more damage to their economies than Putin could ever do in a full-on assault. Check out everything from Irina Slav on her Substack here: https://irinaslav.substack.com/

Russia earned approximately $1.217 trillion USD from fossil fuel exports (oil, gas, LNG) from 2021 to 2024, despite all the sanctions imposed on Russia.

So, in my podcast interviews with George McMillan, where he said “All Puint has to do is nothing,” is spot on, and he is right up there with Irina Slav—being correct multiple times, and creating content that has long-term relevance. You can check out everything on George McMillan here.