#ENB 148: Energy poverty, ecological devastation, and a path forward can only be fixed by sustainable Action. – Captian Kelly

Energy News Beat

There is no ESG without accountability, and energy poverty, hypocrisy, and pollution will continue without action. Which side will you be on?

Energy poverty is one of my biggest concerns, and my conversation with Captin Kelly is one of the most fun yet emotional I have had. We could have gone on for another hour with his wealth of experience, solutions, and working programs, but I had to stop.

Captain Kieran Kelly, Commissioner and CEO of the Ocean Integrity Group, is a fantastic resource of oceanic knowledge and has a mission to take that knowledge and turn it into action for humanity and our environment.

Please follow and support his movement on his LinkedIn HERE: Https://www.linkedin.com/in/captain-kieran-kelly-

00:00 – Introduction

01:06 – Explaining your current activities

02:53 – Strategies for combating poverty while cleaning the oceans

12:32 – Addressing the financial sustainability of ocean cleaning initiatives, including recycling efforts and their impact

14:09 – Captain Kieran Kelly discusses a partnership with a beer company aimed at removing plastic from the oceans

16:09 – Discusses concerns about wind energy, corruption in carbon offset industry, potential harm to marine life from offshore wind turbines, plastic pollution, and preserving marine ecosystems

26:53 – Questions the long-term sustainability of U.S. wind farms due to tax subsidies, carbon neutrality timelines, and maintenance costs

31:14 – Criticizes the misallocation of $3.9 billion earmarked for ocean plastic issues and the importance of addressing local waste management

33:32 – Highlights the overuse of climate change as an explanation for environmental problems and the importance of tackling local waste issues

38:52 – Addressing the needs and aspirations of the next generation

40:59 – Explaining the support received from hotels that back the Captain Kelly programs and their role in environmental preservation

41:58 – Discussing environmental and ethical concerns in the transition to sustainable practices, including child labor, pollution, and poverty in developing nations

49:31 – Informing how people can support and contact you for poverty elimination initiatives

51:35 – Outro

Michael and I are on a mission to talk about energy. If you are a thought leader, government-elected official, CEO, or author of any energy market, contact us and get your story out on our news and podcast channels. – Get in Contact With The Show –

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Spain’s business lobby calls for extension of nuclear power

Energy News Beat

MADRID, Nov 3 (Reuters) – One of Spain’s top business lobby groups called for extending the use of the country’s nuclear plants on Friday, that the government led by acting Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez plans to start closing down from 2027.

The fate of Spain’s nuclear fleet became a hot issue during the recent electoral campaign, with the conservative opposition People’s Party (PP) pledging to reverse the planned phase-out of the nuclear plants, which generate about a fifth of the country’s electricity.

A coalition deal between centre-left parties seeking to form a government confirmed “the orderly and progressive dismantling” of nuclear reactors.

“Ideological positions should not prevent us from recognising the need to extend the useful life of power plants already installed, which guarantee the stability of the system,” said Manuel Perez-Sala, chairman of business lobby Circulo de Empresarios, which says its members include 230 business leaders and top managers.

Keeping nuclear plants running requires multi-billion euros investments in aging plants, but offers the assurance of stable power, he said at an energy transition event the group held in Madrid.

Acting Energy Minister Teresa Ribera, who supports an energy model based on renewable energy such as solar and wind, has defended the nuclear phase-out numerous times.

Extending the life of nuclear plants “is not viable and its cost would necessarily fall on citizens, because it is necessary to guarantee investments in safety,” she said during the electoral campaign.

The lobby group also stressed the importance of legal certainty and “a regulatory framework without ups and downs, particularly of a retroactive nature.”

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In the rapidly shifting world of geoeconomics, the Rest is getting tired of the West

Energy News Beat

If you have not heard about the rise of geopolitics over the past year, where have you been hiding?

So now I want to complicate your lives further and introduce you to its lesser-known but arguably even more important cousin: geoeconomics. Another fancy name for a nebulous concept that boffins regularly confuse you with, you say? Perhaps. But hear me out.

First, let’s begin with a (clunky) definition from my go-to think tank of the moment, Chatham House: “The term ‘geoeconomics’ has become popular but lacks an agreed definition. Most commonly, it is understood as the use of economic tools to advance geopolitical objectives. Other definitions reverse the ends and means, emphasising how flexing geopolitical muscle is used for economic results. Broadly, one can think of the interplay of international economics, geopolitics and strategy.”

I buy this definition, but, in this essay, I want to de-emphasise, where I can, the politics: in today’s fractious world, geopolitics has a way of hijacking almost any discussion to the extent that other considerations barely merit a look-in. I will rather emphasise the geoeconomic data and make a few suggestions as to how this data might be interpreted geopolitically.

Those who know me will know my bedrock contention is that the centre of economic gravity is moving resolutely back to Asia from whence it came some 200 years ago. There is deep demographic logic to this return migration: over half the world’s population lives within 3,200km of Mong Khet in north-eastern Myanmar, inside what is known as the Valeriepieris Circle.

I came across a new statistic last week that reinforces this paradigm shift: 113 million people will enter the world’s consuming classes next year, with 83% or 94 million being Asian, and only 4% or five million from the West.

And, for the first time, India will beat China 33 million to 31 million, underlining the fact that in 2023, India’s population rise overtook China’s.

This population centre of gravity is centrifugally pulling in the geoeconomics: McKinsey estimates the geographic centre of economic gravity in 2023 to be near Kyzyl, on the Russian side of its border with Kazakhstan.

As recently as 1990, this core was close to Norway’s Svalbard Islands; by 2030, it is forecast to be in northern China. From the icy Greenland Sea to the arid Gobi Desert in 40 years? That is paradigm-shifting.

But this is not the narrative you will hear on Bloomberg or CNBC. This is because they inhabit the atmosphere of capital – of “financial markets” – rather than that of trade. The capital atmosphere is captured in movements in stock markets and bond markets and, at a macroeconomic level on a nation’s capital account; furthermore, the only “language” it speaks fluently is nominal US dollars.

By contrast, the atmosphere of trade is best reflected in trade statistics as recorded on a nation’s current account and is very (and I mean very!) approximately measured in Purchasing Power Parity “dollars”. By the latter measure, China overtook the US as the world’s largest economy in 2014 and is now 22% larger. By the former measure, the US economy is still 32% larger than China’s.

Unsurprisingly, the narrative of capital markets remains focused on what is happening in US stock and bond markets: over 60% of the All Country World Index for equities is in US securities, as is over 40% of the All Bond Index.

Add to this the fact that the go-to US dollar index for FX markets is the DXY, an index composed of six Western currencies: the euro, yen, pound, Canadian dollar, Swedish kronor and Swiss franc. Even though Mexico and China are the US’ second and third-largest trade partners, there are no “trade-rich” pesos or renminbi in this “capital atmosphere” basket.

The atmosphere of trade reflects altogether different realities and is perhaps best captured in the statistic that, in 2022, China’s $3.6-trillion worth of exports beat the US’ $2.2-trillion. Without the US’ oil and gas sales abroad, China’s export total would be almost twice that of the US.

It will take several years for the Western-focused world of capital to align with the increasingly Asian-centred world of trade. And much of this catch-up will be facilitated not just by GDP growth in China, but also in ABC: Asia Beyond China.

The latest economic forecasts coming from the IMF’s September annual meeting in Marrakesh clearly show that Asia (and again, not just China) has become the world’s GDP growth locomotive: 2024’s 94 million out of 113 million new members of the world’s consuming classes being Asian will bear witness to that.

If you look through the prism of capital, you can make a case for the argument that the US-centric world is indeed deglobalising. But if you instead peer through the prism of trade, what you see is a world that is re-orienting (pun intended) – one that is moving into the heart of Asia by leaving the North Atlantic behind.

In the meantime, one can broadly expect the pre-eminent status of the US dollar – in its money functions as a store of value, a unit of account and as a standard of deferred payment – to hold sway. (That said, the US dollar’s share of global FX reserves has fallen 6% to under 60% in the past decade.)

What is changing most is that the world is witnessing the US dollar’s grip on the medium of exchange function slip, especially in commodity markets, be it UAE gas exports to India denominated in dirhams, or Indonesian nickel and Australian iron ore exports to China denominated in renminbi.

As the world moves from the post-Cold War unipolarity of the US to the age of multipolarity where many nations participate in helping define the economic character of the global economy, one refrain is constantly heard from these new players: “As a nation, we act in our own best interests: we do what works for us.”

So India will not join a US-led oil embargo on Russia which prevents them from settling that trade in US dollars. Instead, India is perfectly willing to pay Russia for its oil, even if it does so in Chinese renminbi.

And much to the chagrin of the US – which saw the dollar-based New York Clearing House mechanism as an irreplaceable link in the chain of most global trade – countries are finding that bypassing the dollar is surprisingly easy to do. And, what’s more, it is often cheaper too.

All of this threatens the economic hegemony of the US, and not just in the international arena as described above. Before long, these tectonic shifts are likely to have profound – and profoundly destabilising – implications for the US domestic economy as well.

But back to those two atmospheres – one for capital, one for trade. They intersect in a nation’s current account position. For the US, their current account deficit means they are short the trade atmosphere by about $1-trillion a year and so – if the dollar is to hold its value, the US must be long of roughly an equivalent amount of imported capital from the rest of the world’s capital atmosphere.

Those nations that run current account surpluses – the Eurozone, China, Japan, Switzerland and Saudi Arabia, for example – are long the trade atmosphere and so are net contributors of their surpluses to that capital atmosphere. (Economists also characterise this situation as a nation that runs a current account deficit as being savings deficient and therefore needing to import savings through their capital account, savings generated from the current account surpluses run by other countries.)

So far, so good. But this is where the geoeconomics moves to another much higher level… and yes, this is where geopolitics starts to enter the equation.

Such is the level of net dissavings by the US created by its current account deficit that it generates 60% plus of ALL such deficits worldwide. In other words, the US consumes 60% plus of all internationally mobile savings to balance its trade-short external account. Sixty percent? Not bad for 4.2% of the world’s population!

And there are growing signs that at least some of those nations previously providing their savings to the US are growing weary of funding what is in effect the US’ excess consumption. Another way of saying this – using the logic of Ben Bernanke, the former chairman of the US Federal Reserve, but applying it in reverse – is that some of the world’s “surplus savers” no longer feel so inclined to let the US’ “surplus consumption” absorb the lion’s share of those savings.

Before proceeding, it is worth detailing exactly to what ends these surplus savings have been applied. The TICS data provided monthly by the US Treasury tells us where these savings go. (All figures are net flows; all trends are those evident over the past decade.)

Since 2014, foreign flows into US equities have – albeit with fluctuations, especially over Covid – been on a generally declining trend. Similarly, flows from foreign official sources like central banks have declined to be almost negligible today.

So what has been the principal destination for private foreign capital inflows – part of those foreign excess savings – into the US? The short answer is not US Inc equity instruments, but rather US government debt instruments. In particular, foreigners have bought Treasury Bonds and Bills, with much smaller amounts going into still-government-backed Agency Bonds as well as corporate bonds.

For the year to end September 2023, these net flows have been Treasuries $597-billion, Agency Bonds $125-billion; and Corporate Bonds $187-billion, together a total inflow of $909-billion.

Add in net flows into equities for the same period – $168-billion – and the US current account deficit is essentially covered, allowing the imbalance of its trade atmosphere to be “equilibrated” by that “kindness of strangers”: capital, or more precisely, savings from abroad.

As the above category totals show, foreign savings flowing into US Treasuries ($597-billion) contribute to the funding of the US’ budget deficit, this year forecast to top $1.7-trillion.

As a past rule of thumb, I estimated this kindness of strangers would fund over half of the US’ annual budget deficit, but this 50%+ ratio may now also be falling.

Earlier this year, the 12-month total into US Treasuries was close to $1-trillion; the subsequent drop off to $597-billion by September may help explain the disastrous performance of the US Treasury market in 2023.

Are foreigners “falling out of love” with US Treasuries? Given the disastrous performance of US Bonds since 2021, it would not be a surprise.

Now add this final observation to the mix: that the US, again with only 4.2% of the world’s population, runs over 42% of all budget deficits worldwide.

With these factual foundations laid down, let us now move on to the emerging geoeconomic tensions in the global economy; tensions that are exacerbated by the intensifying winds of geopolitics, be they blowing from Ukraine, Gaza or Taiwan.

There is growing evidence that leading players in the non-West – sometimes collectively called the Global South – are increasingly impatient with the underhand way the West loads the dice in its favour in the playing of the world economic game.

On 14 December 2022, the UN General Assembly voted on a resolution: “Towards a New International Economic Order”. The vote split perfectly between the Rest (123 in favour) and the West (50 against): only Türkiye abstained.

West vs Rest unanimity in this vote was near total, and there were plenty of democracies who voted in the latter camp: it was not a divide between democracies and autocracies.

However, there is far from unanimity in the reasons for this impatience among the Rest, and even less agreement as to what sort of economic order might replace it. But there is a coalescing sense coming from these discontents around the idea of, “well, definitely not the current one!”

So far, I have not seen any analysis where this impatience takes the form of: “Since some of we non-Westerners provide a sizeable share of our surplus savings to keep the US show on the road (and, albeit on a smaller scale, the British one), unless things really start to change, we might see fit to withhold some or all of those savings.”

But I fully expect a researcher in, say, the BRICS New Development Bank to put two and two together and come up with four.

Often, it seems as if a political event might give further impetus to the campaign to reform underlying economic grievances.

When the United States vetoed a resolution from BRICS founding member Brazil at the UN Security Council calling for “humanitarian pauses” in the Gaza conflict, it again highlighted the powerlessness of current multilateral institutions to address those issues that concern the wider UN Assembly: economic advancement and security and human rights for all – not just for those communities favoured by the West.

This resolution came soon after the end of the annual International Monetary Fund and World Bank meeting in Morocco. At Marrakesh, the contentious issue of global governance reform was again raised.

The IMF is arguably the most important economic organisation that the Global South wants reformed. At present, it has skewed-to-the-West voting ratios: the US’ 17.4% is almost three times that of China; the UK’s significantly larger than India, and Belgium’s is bigger than Indonesia.

The reforms envisaged would upend the pro-Western voting weights, including possibly ending the US’ right of veto were its quota to fall below 15%.

Likewise, the “droit de seigneur” exercised by the US and Europe at the two Washington DC multi-laterals (where the US gets to choose the head of the World Bank while Europe gets to nominate the head of the IMF) may need to be replaced with a more “democratic” arrangement.

Meanwhile, over at the UN, it is becoming increasingly untenable for the permanent five members of the Security Council (and especially the US, UK and France) to stall Indian and even Brazilian membership of that inner grouping.

Finally, this time thinking geostrategically, what might happen to the US’ defence budget ($837-billion) if foreign inflows began to dry up? That budget currently allows the US to spend more on defence than the next 10 countries combined and, in so doing, maintain over 750 foreign bases – 80% of all foreign bases worldwide.

My primary interest however is focused on the geoeconomic fallout of a possible shift away from non-Western countries choosing to deploy their international savings in US government debt instruments and thereby underwrite the ballooning US government deficit.

The reason for this is that their actions may yet destabilise the foundation of US capital markets: the US bond market. This they would do by undermining the foundational price of risk in global capital markets, the yield on the 10-year US Treasury.

It is difficult to speculate as to what would be the full ramifications if these non-Western surplus recyclers were to shift even some of their surplus savings elsewhere. Yet, as it is, there is tentative evidence that they are beginning to do just that.

And, though the connection is all but impossible to “prove”, this could be one reason why Western financial markets – led by that axiomatic US bond market – have been struggling for nearly three years. (This period has led to the worst returns for US bonds since 1871.)

Already we see that several surplus-running countries outside the West seem less inclined to recycle the same share of their surpluses into US securities as previously: even the Saudis have reduced their central bank Treasury Bill holdings by 45% in the past three years, to $108-billion today.

Instead, these surplus runners have directed more of their national savings towards a variety of alternative assets. Gold reserves have risen sharply in the Global South central bank community, notably in China, Russia, India, the Central Asian “stans” and Türkiye: in the first nine months of 2023, such holdings rose 800 tonnes, over seven times South Africa’s 2022 production of 110 tonnes.

Sovereign wealth funds from Greater Arabia are increasing their exposure to Asian assets, including private equity and property. Middle Eastern companies – especially in the oil and petrochemical sectors – have been increasing their foreign direct investments in existing companies as well as start-ups across Asia, including China and India.

Perhaps the most telling strategy of all comes from the biggest surplus runner: China. While systematically reducing its US Treasury holdings – from $1.3-trillion in 2014 to under $800-billion today – it appears as if a sizeable share of China’s surplus has rather been recycled into its strategic stockpiles of commodities.

Besides gold, oil, nickel, uranium and cobalt have all seen notably large Chinese purchases beyond China’s current consumption needs. Perhaps the most unremarked upon “beneficiary” has been grains. China now holds 70% of world maize reserves, 60% of rice, 50% of wheat and 30% of soya. (Note under IMF rules, gold can be included in their definition of FX reserves, but other commodities cannot.)

So how do these geoeconomic facts connect to the geopolitical environment? My sense is that the two are connected by a two-way feedback mechanism, where the geopolitical concerns get reflected onto the geoeconomic foundation and vice versa. Increasingly, political and economic decisions are then taken by nations – individually, collectively – that align both. All this tends to happen while prioritising an individual nation’s economic self-interest in the process.

If this is so, given that the US and much of the West are floundering in the geopolitical arena, the world is seeing nations outside the West taking actions that could destabilise the current economic structure of the world – and particularly in the atmosphere for capital – as we have come to know it.

Evidence of this growing frustration in the Rest with the priorities of the West was well captured in a quote from the Indian Foreign Minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar: “Somewhere, Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems.”

Many countries in the Rest would add the US to Europe in this quote.

Add to this the growing perception in much of the Rest that the moral high ground the Western democracies occupied for much of the postwar era is increasingly tarnished. The US-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – where, respectively, no weapons of mass destruction and no Osama bin Laden were found – accelerated this process; neither invasion was sanctioned by the UN, but both went ahead regardless.

The Gaza conflict provides an all-too-tragic current example. Many non-Western nations (though not South Africa) supported the West’s position on Ukraine in the UN, some decrying the neo-imperialism exhibited by Russia as well as its callous approach towards the wellbeing of Ukraine’s civilians.

With that in mind, these same nations of the Rest – while unreservedly deploring Hamas’ actions on 7 October – cannot understand why so many Western nations now implicitly defend Israel’s livelihood-threatening and even life-taking actions towards Gaza’s civilians.

Some Western nations – notably the trade deficit running US – even go so far as to veto “humanitarian pauses” that would allow medicine, food and water to be distributed within the besieged Palestinian enclave. The visible squirming of the US’ UN ambassador as she vainly tried to square this sad circle was there for all UN members to see.

The charge of hypocrisy against the US and its close Western allies now hangs heavily in the air.

Such duplicitous behaviour by some Western nations means the growing reservations of the Rest leak from the geopolitical arena into the geoeconomic one. And then, by the Rest’s subsequent economic actions no longer aligning themselves to Western priorities, they leak back from the geoeconomic into the geopolitical.

And thus we find a world that is very different from that of the 1950s. For then, the winners of World War 2 mostly had right on their side: even the Europeans had begun the process of decolonisation.

Today, for all the high-minded expressions from the leaders of the West as to, “what is the right thing to do”, their mask has slipped and the old – and terrifying – logic of “might makes right” has again been revealed.

And more and more, many nations in the Rest simply do not agree with that mantra, even if, regrettably, some of those same nations still practice such behaviour too.

Thus, where they can, some of these Global South nations have resolved to take their trade – and even their surplus capital – elsewhere.

Frequently, this “elsewhere” means Asia, a destination that has the added advantage of offering product that is cheaper – and increasingly better – than that found in the West.

Indeed, the ultimate confirmation of this is that many leading Western multinationals also source their manufactured products from Asia – exhibit A, the iPhone 15 – for precisely the same two reasons.

Source: Dailymaverick.co.za

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Mideast War Turns Spotlight on Arab Gas Pipeline

Energy News Beat

The Israel-Hamas war has not significantly impacted Mideast oil and gas flows so far, but critical energy infrastructure such as the Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP) is being watched closely.

The pipeline connects Egypt with Jordan and gas shipments via AGP have been disrupted in the past by attacks in the Sinai Peninsula.

Jordan imports almost all of the energy it needs, and if gas stopped flowing through AGP, it could have serious socio-economic implications and lead to instability in that country.

If the conflict in Gaza escalates, it could also deal a serious blow to sentiment among international investors at a time when Israel and Lebanon both want to encourage offshore oil and gas exploration.

High casualty levels in Gaza and an expansion of the conflict into a regional war could drive “a severe degradation of the investment climate” in the Levant and the Gulf, according to Eurasia Group.

If war breaks out along Israel’s northern border with Lebanon and Iran becomes involved, there could be “massive hits to business and consumer confidence,” Eurasia added.

Energy Intelligence takes a look below at the countries that are connected to the Arab Gas Pipeline.

Egypt

Egypt, Africa’s third-largest natural gas producer, has come under pressure because of the Israel-Hamas war.

It relies on Israeli gas imports during the summer months to keep the lights on and air conditioners running.

AGP — with a reported capacity of 234 billion cubic feet per year (640 million cubic feet per day) — currently ships natural gas from Egypt to Jordan at annual rates of 26 Bcf and 44 Bcf.

Exports from Israel’s giant Leviathan field — operated by US major Chevron — flow through the AGP system.

As domestic demand has soared, Cairo is facing a supply crunch. It has tried to reduce its gas consumption by 20% this year and halted LNG exports from its two liquefaction plants over the summer.

Average gas production for the 2022/23 fiscal year to Jun. 30 was 6.2 Bcf/d, while average consumption hit 5.9 Bcf/d, Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Co. confirmed last month.

Egypt said this week that its imports of Israeli gas fell to zero from recent levels around 800 MMcf/d.

However, upstream operators contradicted that, telling Energy Intelligence that Israeli gas exports to Jordan had continued via Egypt.

Meanwhile, the East Mediterranean Gas pipeline running from Ashkelon in Israel to Arish in northern Egypt — close to the area of conflict in Gaza — has been closed down as a precaution.

Jordan

Jordan, which imports more than 90% of its energy needs, relies on gas that is delivered via Egypt and Israel.

In addition to gas supplied by AGP, Israel’s gas transmission system has an onshore connection with the Jordanian gas network near the Israeli town of Beit She’an.

Jordan is under pressure to sever ties with Tel Aviv, after Israel’s offensive in Gaza — in response to the deadly Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel — claimed more than 9,000 Palestinian lives so far.

Israel’s strikes in Gaza have fueled anger in Jordan, which has a large Palestinian population, many of whom are Jordanian citizens.

The kingdom relies heavily on international aid and grants to cover its budget and current account deficits, and disruption of gas flows could worsen already difficult economic conditions and stoke social unrest.

Israel

Israel is the second-largest natural gas producer in the Eastern Mediterranean after Egypt.

After the Hamas attack, Israel closed down the Chevron-operated Tamar offshore gas field as a precaution because of its proximity to Gaza. The field had previously been supplying gas to Israel and Egypt.

The country is reportedly exporting 70% less natural gas since it shut down Tamar at a cost of around $200 million a month, according to a report by consulting firm BDO.

Israel had recently advanced several pipeline capacity expansions to meet rapidly rising demand for gas in Egypt, which looks set to face a gas shortage by the middle of next year.

In August, the government approved an increase in pipeline gas exports to Egypt of about 350 MMcf/d for the next 11 years.

Israeli government sources say a plan to build a new onshore pipeline connecting Israel’s southern gas pipeline network to the AGP by 2026 could be impacted by the war.

The proposed Nitzana pipeline would have a capacity of 580 MMcf/d to 770 MMcf/d.

If the pipeline project is disrupted that would affect Chevron’s plans to increase gas output from the Tamar field from 1.1 Bcf/d to 1.6 Bcf/d, with first gas from the expansion due by early 2025.

Despite the conflict, Israel recently awarded European majors Eni and BP offshore oil and gas exploration blocks as part of its fourth upstream bid round.

Lebanon

Lebanon is currently facing the worst economic crisis since its independence. It has long been plagued by power shortages and continues to grapple with energy shortages.

Up to now, Lebanon’s crude oil and fuel needs have been met by supplies from Iraq as well as refineries in Turkey and Italy.

Lebanon does not currently receive gas from the Arab Gas Pipeline, although there has been talk of using it to deliver gas via Syria for power generation in Lebanon.

Unlike Egypt and Israel, Lebanon does not currently produce gas, but its government estimates that there could be 25 trillion cubic feet or more of untapped resources in the waters off its coast.

Source: Energyintel.com

Source: Offshore-energy.biz

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China, Russia Intensify Efforts to Expedite New Gas Route Supply Agreement

Energy News Beat

(MENAFN) China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) Vice President, Xie Jun, has disclosed that Russian energy giant Gazprom is collaborating with China to fast-track the implementation of a new gas supply route known as the Far Eastern route. This initiative aims to deliver Russian natural gas to China from the offshore reserves near Sakhalin Island.

Speaking at the plenary session of the St. Petersburg International Gas Forum, Xie Jun stated, “Our company and Gazprom are striving to build a closer energy partnership and are systematically accelerating the implementation of the gas supply project along the Far Eastern route.”

The collaboration between Moscow and Beijing was solidified in February with an agreement to enhance natural gas supplies to China via the Far Eastern route. This ambitious project includes the construction of a cross-border section across the Ussuri River, connecting the operational Russian pipeline to the Chinese city of Hulin. Once fully operational, this route will have the capacity to transport 10 billion cubic meters of Russian pipeline gas to China annually.

Presently, Russia fulfills its gas commitments to China through the Power of Siberia pipeline, a segment of the Eastern Route, in accordance with a 30-year bilateral agreement. Gas deliveries commenced in 2019, and the pipeline is anticipated to reach its full operational capacity of 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually by 2025.

As both nations deepen their energy cooperation, the intensified efforts to advance the Far Eastern route underscore their shared commitment to diversifying energy supply routes and strengthening their strategic partnership in the energy sector. This development is poised to have far-reaching implications for regional energy security and economic integration between China and Russia.

Source: Menafn.com

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Southeast Asia’s LNG investments predicted to peak by 2040: Study

Energy News Beat

More natural gas facilities than ever will be firing in Southeast Asia almost two decades from now, according to a report by Singapore-based research firm Asia Research & Engagement (ARE).

Led by Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore, the region currently has liquified natural gas (LNG) facilities operating at a capacity of 45 million tonnes per annum (Mtpa), which release the equivalent greenhouse gas emissions of about 30 coal plants in one year.

This is expected to almost double to a capacity of 80 Mtpa by 2040, as proposed projects, mostly in Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam will be completed by then.

“If allowed to continue, expanded LNG use stands to thwart efforts to keep global warming below 1.5 C,” ARE’s report read. “Growing investment in LNG by the Philippines, Vietnam, and other Southeast Asian nations will only help push the world further beyond this critical target.”

Last year’s biggest addition to global LNG consumption was Thailand’s new US$900 million regasification facility, with a capacity of 7.5 Mtpa, added the analysis.

The Philippines and Vietnam made their first forays into LNG this year.

The Philippines received a shipment in April to fuel its 1,200 megawatt (MW) Ilijan power plant, amid declining reserves from its Malampaya natural gas field off the province of Batangas and after Asian spot LNG prices slid from all-time highs in 2022. The purchase was handled by AGP International Holdings, backed by Osaka Gas and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation.

A month later, Vietnam’s first imports of LNG arrived with a shipment of 70,000 tonnes of Indonesian LNG purchased by state-run PetroVietnam Gas. The new terminals in both Southeast Asian nations are slated to expand the region’s LNG import capacity by 7.8 Mtpa.

The Philippine government has been promoting renewable energy, but as part of its energy development plan, it continues to approve projects to import LNG as a transitional fuel. Although Vietnam is trying to reduce its reliance on coal while tackling worsening power shortages that imperil its fast-growing economy, its development plan likewise calls for more than doubling its reliance on natural gas.

Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore began importing LNG in the 2010s, and Myanmar did so in 2020. Cambodia is preparing to start taking shipments, with a three-phase plan to promote the fuel’s adoption at home.

“Southeast Asia’s limited legacy LNG infrastructure makes the pivot to low-carbon power sources a viable option compared to investing in new LNG infrastructure,” Kurt Metzger, energy transition director of ARE, told Eco-Business.

“The new research underscores that LNG’s carbon intensity is on par with coal, emphasising the necessity of investing in solar, wind, and low-carbon sources to limit global warming below 1.5 degrees.”

Indonesia has the most LNG operating in Southeast Asia, as of 2021, but is expected to be overtaken by Thailand, once its facilities that are both under construction and proposed will be operational by 2040.

In the rest of the world, the report’s authors find it worrisome that the expected production of LNG “far exceeds” what global energy authority International Energy Agency (IEA) calculates is necessary to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement.

The report noted how IEA predicts that LNG used globally must peak in 2025 and decline to 150 Mtpa by 2040 to achieve its 2050 net zero target. But oil firm Shell forecasts in its outlook this year that demand will reach almost 700 Mtpa by 2040, with projected LNG production and supply rising by 20 per cent to 480 Mtpa based on LNG infrastructure currently under construction.

Natural gas is considered a cleaner-burning fuel because it releases up to 60 per cent less carbon dioxide than coal. But experts have flagged the climate impacts of methane—a powerful greenhouse gas—that is emitted during its production, transportation and combustion.

Source: Eco-business.com

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Following BP’s exit, operatorship of giant gas discoveries changes hands, as US player takes the reins

Energy News Beat

U.S.-headquartered oil and gas exploration and production company Kosmos Energy has boosted its working interest and taken the operatorship helm of giant gas discoveries offshore Senegal, after BP’s withdrawal from the field. This is subject to customary government approvals and will assist the American firm in advancing significant future natural gas and LNG development opportunities.

According to Kosmos Energy, it has increased its working interest to 90% and assumed operatorship -subject to customary government approvals – of the huge Yakaar-Teranga gas field development offshore Senegal, deemed to contain one of the world’s largest gas discoveries in recent years, holding around 25 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of advantaged gas in place, with negligible carbon dioxide content and minimal impurities, reducing the need for processing ahead of transportation/liquefaction.

Andrew G. Inglis, Kosmos Energy’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, commented: “Yakaar-Teranga is one of the crown jewels of Senegal’s growing energy sector and this aligned partnership allows Kosmos and Petrosen to accelerate the development of a cost-competitive gas project supporting Senegal’s goal of providing universal and reliable access to low-cost energy. The project is also expected to lower emissions by displacing heavy fuel oil in the country’s energy mix.

“In addition, the project is expected to deliver LNG export volumes to global markets, further establishing Senegal as an important and reliable supplier of energy to the world. I would like to thank Petrosen for their support to progress this opportunity. Kosmos looks forward to delivering a project that is aligned with the country’s strategic development plan, ‘Plan Sénégal Emergent,’ to drive social progress and inclusive economic growth in Senegal for many years to come.”

Furthermore, the U.S. player has been working closely with Petrosen and the government of Senegal on an innovative development concept that prioritizes cost-competitive gas to the rapidly growing domestic market, combined with an offshore LNG facility targeting exports into international markets. The currently envisioned development concept is an offshore development producing approximately 550 million standard cubic feet of gas per day with domestic gas transported via pipeline to shore and export volumes liquified on a floating LNG vessel.

Kosmos explains that the concept is now being optimized to best meet the domestic and international requirements, after which the project will move into front-end design and engineering (FEED). As concept optimization progresses, the firm’s aim is for Petrosen to participate as an equal partner in the full value chain with a greater working interest.

Moreover, the two companies plan to evaluate potential partnership strategies with the objective of creating an aligned partnership possessing the necessary upstream and midstream expertise, coupled with access to cost-effective financing and exposure to end markets.

Thierno Seydou Ly, Petrosen’s Director General, Upstream, remarked: “Yakaar-Teranga is a strategic project and a key asset for the government’s ‘gas-to-power’ and ‘gas-to-industry’ initiatives, which aim to provide affordable, abundant, and cleaner energy as part of the country’s ‘Plan Sénégal Emergent.’

“With a simplified and aligned partnership, we look forward to advancing the project, increasing Petrosen’s expertise through knowledge and skills transfer, and providing economic, social, and environmental benefits to the people of Senegal.”

Source: Offshore-energy.biz

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Shell Prefers Share Buybacks over Big Acquisitions: CEO

Energy News Beat

Shell PLC’s capital deployment strategy favors repurchasing company stocks more than absorbing rivals, chief executive officer (CEO) Wael Sawan has said, in contrast to USA competitors Chevron Corp. and Exxon Mobil Corp.

Reporting a 23 percent quarter-on-quarter increase in adjusted earnings to $6.2 billion for the third quarter, the British energy giant said it has approved a buyback program for the next three months amounting to $3.5 billion. That brings its share redemption program for the second half of 2023 to $6.5 billion and total announced stockholder distributions for the year to about $23 billion.

“If we then look at how we want to be able to deploy capital, our preference right now is to continue to buy that very attractive asset base that we have, and the free cash flow yield that is also a very healthy free cash flow yield”, Sawan, who took over as Shell boss at the start of 2023, said in a question and answer session with analysts.

Shell posted $0.93 in adjusted earnings per share for the July–September 2023 quarter. Its free cash flow stood at $7.51 billion for the latest three-month period, with $12.33 billion generated from operating activities, the London-based company announced Thursday.

It recorded $5.65 billion in cash capital expenditure and $10.1 billion in operating expenses.

USA rival Chevron earlier reported $3.05 in adjusted earnings per share. The San Ramon, California-based company had $5 billion in free cash flow, compared to $4.7 billion capital expenses, according to its quarterly report October 27.

Another American major, ExxonMobil, reported the same day $2.25 earnings per share. It recorded $16 billion in free cash flow and $5.2 billion in capital expenditure.

Earlier in October Spring, Texas-based Exxon Mobil announced it was acquiring Pioneer Natural Resources in an all-stock transaction valued at $59.5 billion.

“The merger combines Pioneer’s more than 850,000 net acres in the Midland Basin with ExxonMobil’s 570,000 net acres in the Delaware and Midland Basins, creating the industry’s leading high-quality undeveloped U.S. unconventional inventory position”, said a joint press release October 11.

“The merger is anticipated to be accretive immediately and highly accretive mid- to long-term to ExxonMobil earnings per share and free cash flow, with a long cash flow runway”, ExxonMobil added. “ExxonMobil’s strong balance sheet combined with Pioneer’s added surplus free cash flow provides upside opportunity to enhance shareholder capital returns post-closing”.

Later October 23 Chevron said it was purchasing Hess Corp. in an all-stock transaction worth $53 billion.

“The combined company is expected to grow production and free cash flow faster and for longer than Chevron’s current five-year guidance”, Chevron and Hess said in a joint news release about the definitive deal set to close in the first half of 2024.

For Shell however, the financial growth strategy is to continue “to preferentially allocate our capital towards share buybacks, more so than going for big acquisitions”, Sawan said in the session with analysts shared on the company’s YouTube channel.

For this year, Shell has now curbed the upper range of its capex to $23–25 billion from $23–26 billion in the second quarter and $23–27 billion in the first quarter.

Its results for the third quarter were weighed down by “lower margins due to seasonal impacts, primarily in Europe, and lower trading and optimization results”, as well as lower output, as stated in its earnings news release. These were offset by “favorable trading and optimization results combined with higher realized liquids prices”.

“We continue to simplify our portfolio while delivering more value with less emissions”, Sawan said in comments for the earnings media release.

Shell closed the first nine months of 2023 with $141.25 billion in current assets, including $43.03 billion in cash and cash equivalents. Its total current liabilities stood at $95.13 billion, including $10.12 billion in debt.

Source: Rigzone.com

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Solar Panels Are Three Times More Carbon-Intensive Than IPCC Claims

Energy News Beat

This investigation was done in collaboration with Environmental Progress and The Blind Spot

Last August, in an amalgamation of “The Green New Deal” meets “Build Back Better,” President Joe Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act gifted the renewables industry with billions of dollars worth of taxpayer-funded subsidies.

What few backing the bill realized was that the largest beneficiary would likely be China due to its expansive grip on the global solar photovoltaic (PV) industry. Worse than that, it might end up misdirecting the world’s clean energy efforts into dirtier than appreciated energy technologies because of the country’s ongoing dependence on coal-fired energy.

Information unearthed by Environmental Progress, a nonprofit research organization, points to a gaping oversight in how the figures influencing government net zero policy and investments in solar worldwide are compiled and collated due to the difficulty of collecting accurate information out of China, especially for the purification processes used to create silicon wafers.

The key to this blind spot is that a small number of data compilers provides the source material for most of the assessments. And many, if not all, of them work in collaboration with the International Energy Agency (IEA). The industry voluntarily submits the data in response to academic surveys. The nature and profile of the respondents are never publicly revealed, so there is the potential for conflicts of interest to develop.

A further puzzle is how that data feeds into an organization called Ecoinvent, a Swiss-based non-profit founded in 1998 that dubs itself “the world’s most consistent and transparent life cycle inventory database.” This data is relied on by institutions worldwide, including the IPCC and IEA itself, to calculate their carbon footprint projections, including the sixth assessment report published as recently as March 2023.

Based on such data, the IPCC claims solar PV is 48 gCO2/kWh. But, as we’ll see below, a new investigation started by Italian researcher Enrico Mariutti suggests that the number is closer to between 170 and 250 gCO2/kWh, depending on the energy mix used to power PV production. If this estimate is accurate, solar would not compare favorably with natural gas, which is around 50 gCO2/kWh with carbon capture and 400 to 500 without.

China’s Dirty Fuel Advantage

Paul Basore and David Feldman, Solar Photovoltaics: Supply Chain Deep Dive Assessment, U.S. Department of Energy, February 24, 2022.

Over the course of a four-month investigation, Environmental Progress has confirmed that Ecoinvent — perhaps the world’s largest database on the environmental impact of renewables — has no data from China about its photovoltaic industry. Meanwhile, the ultimate source of the IEA’s supposedly public data on PV carbon intensity is confidential, and the data, therefore, is unverifiable.

Much of the cradle-to-grave carbon intensity data that governments depend on to guide photovoltaic arrays are instead based on modeling assumptions that are likely to have grossly under-estimated — if not made up — solar’s carbon emissions because they cannot get insights from Chinese manufacturers.

In its most recent report, the IEA predicts that China will continue to dominate solar energy production, delivering over 50 percent of solar PV projects globally by 2024. This trajectory is especially concerning given that China already commands most solar panel production.

The IEA noted that in 2022 China’s manufacturing capacity for wafers, cells, and modules rose 40-50 percent and almost doubled for silicon. In fact, according to market intelligence firm Bernreuter Research, in 2021, China produced more than 80 percent of global solar-grade polysilicon, a critical input into solar arrays. It doesn’t stop there; China manufactures 97 percent of the global supply of solar wafers, another essential component.

How China amassed that market concentration remains an inconvenient truth, all too readily swept under the rug by those pushing for net zero policies.

What we know for sure is that up until the mid-2000s, the market was dominated by Japanese, US, and German manufacturers, many of whom were in the midst of automating their production lines, when Chinese manufacturers swooped in to take their market share. The disruption happened in under a decade, with China’s global share of PV production surging from 14 percent in 2006 to 60 percent by 2013.

But the majority of experts consulted by Environmental Progress agree that China’s competitive advantage did not lie in an innovative new technological process but rather in the very same factors the country has always used to outcompete the West: cheap coal-fired energy, mass government subsidies for strategic industries, and human labor operating in poor working conditions.

Basic reasoning suggests the manufacturing shift must have added to solar’s carbon intensity. But as Environmental Progress has learned, nobody in the carbon counting world has seen fit to research by how much. The modelers are estimating the carbon emissions of solar production as if the panels are still made mostly in the West, grossly underestimating their carbon intensity, even as governments rush to draft and implement net zero policy based on the very same flawed data.

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A Lone And Obstinate Italian Data Crusader

Enrico Mariutti (source: LinkedIn)

The China-sized black hole at the heart of the world’s photovoltaic data might, in the context of the industry, seem obvious.

That didn’t make it any easier for Enrico Mariutti, an introspective but compulsive 37-year-old Italian from Rome, to convince others in the field there might be a problem. It was Mariutti who first made substantial efforts to flag the data discrepancies.

Like Greta Thunberg, Mariutti comes to the tale as an environmental obsessive passionate about facilitating the world’s transition from fossil fuels to cleaner forms of energy. Unlike Greta, Mariutti finished school and knows how to crunch through a data set. He holds a degree in geopolitics and global security, which, while unrelated to the field, has equipped him with enough quantitative skills to ensure he can recognize the difference between good and bad data.

Mariutti first noticed something wasn’t quite right with photovoltaic assessments about two years ago. He was preparing for an online renewables debate with Nicola Armaroli, a research director at the Italian Research Council. But being a data junkie, he decided to pour over the source material to try and figure out why. What he discovered unnerved him. The data didn’t reconcile.

“They [the data] showed how much solar photovoltaic systems used in terms of raw materials: silicon, aluminum, copper, glass, steel, and silver. Then I saw the carbon footprint. It just seemed way too small,” he told Environmental Progress.

According to his findings, the carbon intensity of solar panels manufactured in China and installed in European countries like Italy was off by an order of magnitude. An initial back-of-the-envelope calculation put it at between 170 and 250g of carbon dioxide per kilowatt hour (kWh), as opposed to the official estimate from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) of 20-40g per kWh. Way off.

The scale of the IPCC’s undercount shocks once applied to the EU’s “clean” energy plans. Following Mariutti’s math, the esteemed scientific body underestimates the emissions from the EU’s solar installations built in 2022 alone by 5.4 to 7.6 million metric tons, equivalent to adding 3.4 to 4.8 million cars on the road for a year.

By 2020, Mariutti felt compelled to make his findings public. He managed to publish an op-ed in Italy’s premier financial newspaper Il Sole. The piece argued it was wrong to describe an energy transition that depended on mineral-hungry tech, which “could double the exploitation of the earth’s resources within a few decades,” as a green revolution. It was a hit and went viral across Italian social media.

Enthused by what felt like a public mandate for his mission, Mariutti continued his research, firing off dozens of queries to the data compilers. Responses, however, were far from forthcoming. Until one day in November 2022, a leading Dutch renewables expert, Mariska de Wild-Scholten, replied.

Mariutti was delighted to have made an inroad. Wild-Scholten had been one of five key authors who had made significant contributions — she is named some 454 times  —  to the IEA report Life Cycle Inventories and Life Cycle Assessments of Photovoltaic Systems (2020) — a starting point for much government decision-making on net zero policy.

But what she told Mariutti was not reassuring.

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De Wild-Scholten’s Secret Data Stash

Mariska de Wild-Scholten (credit: LinkedIn)

In two emailed responses, Wild-Scholten said that, when determining the electricity consumption of silicon purification, which is used to make wafers, she rarely read scientific papers “because of low data quality, outdated data and or non-transparent data,” while saying little about her own preferred sources other than that it is based on surveys. Responses to other queries were no more reassuring.

Mariutti asked what she thought about 192 countries deciding their long-term energy strategy based on data that at the time reasonably underestimated the average carbon intensity of photovoltaic energy by one order of magnitude (40 vs. 250 gCO2/kWh). Her reply invited more questions than answers. “My experience is that nobody would like to pay for the data aggregation which is needed to come up with publicly available and free updates,” she said, adding that she was working on updating the public data “but only slowly.” Little to no indication was given for the source of her own data.

But, she said, she was happy to share the data she used to inform the 2020 IEA study — attaching it to the email — because it was now “outdated”. It was based on confidential individual company data, she said but did not specify the regional profile of those companies or any other aspects of their identity. She had kept it private only because she had not managed to get the studies funded.

By February 2023, Mariutti decided to self-publish his findings on his own website in a piece titled, “The dirty secret of the solar industry.” The piece made a bold claim: scientists were disingenuously using European data to model the carbon intensity of Chinese solar manufacturing. Was the goal here, he asked, to measure the carbon footprint of solar energy or merely to convince us that it’s green?

With a little prod from Mariutti, it was picked up in May in a piece by Giovanni Brussato for the Milan-based weekly Panorama. Brussato drew on Mariutti’s claim that one needs only to look at the life cycle analysis of China’s glass industry by the China Development and Reform Commission to see if there is a data reconciliation problem.

According to Chinese sources, it noted, glass manufacturing – another critical input in solar production – bears a carbon footprint of only 0.68 kgCO2e/Kg despite an admitted 70 percent dependence on coal-fired energy. A comparable study by Western researchers into the UK’s glass industry, which is mostly powered by cleaner natural gas energy, based on data from Eurostat and Guardian Europe, assessed the industry as having a carbon footprint of 1.12 KgCO2e/kg. To compare, the IEA scores solar between 0.5 and 1 kgCO2e/kg and Ecoinvent with 1 kgCO2e/kg.

A major issue with solar data, according to Mariutti, is that data compilers have been slow to recognize the displacement of the industry to China. It wasn’t until 2016, long after much PV production had already moved east, that the transition appeared on data collectors’ radars. But even then, they depended on new estimates and models rather than data from the source.

“In 2014, they calculated the carbon intensity of PV energy as if the panels were made in Europe, with low-carbon energy,” Mariutti told Environmental Progress, referring to data compilers. “By 2016, calculations started to appear as if the panels were made in China, i.e., supposedly with carbon-intensive energy.”

However, whatever model was used, the resulting carbon intensity was always around 20 to 40 gCO2/kWh. “Had they done the math right, it would come out at around 80 to 106 gCO2/kWh, and that’s with important factors still left out,” claims Mariutti.

After the publication of the Panorama piece, Mariutti’s claims drew the reaction of Dr. Marco Raugei, a leading researcher of emissions from renewable technologies at Oxford Brookes University, embroiling both in an extended online spat.

“We all used Chinese electricity mixes for c-Si PV. And we still got results nowhere near as high as you imply one would. So something is clearly off in your back-of-the-envelope calculations,” Raugei tweeted in April this year. By way of example, he cited an influential paper from 2021 on the sustainability of PV systems by life-cycle analysts Enrica Leccisi and Vsili Fthenakis.

Mariutti had previously critiqued Leccisi and Fthenakis’ analysis in his self-published piece, noting that while the electrical input of solar was modeled according to a Chinese scenario, thermal input remained European. After Mariutti pointed out to Raugei that he had tried to contact Leccisi for comment on his findings without success, the conversation with Raugei went cold.

In further correspondence with Environmental Progress, Dr. Raugei stressed that in his research, he endeavored to use the closest possible approximations to Chinese data in order to create a realistic scenario.

The Missing Chinese Data

EcoInvent web site (source: Ecoinvent.org)

When scientists, academics, or researchers lack accurate data in the Western world, they usually work hard to fill the data void directly. Major efforts are undertaken, and huge sums are spent on sourcing ever more reliable and better data.

Not so, however, with the China data anomaly. A lack of transparency, language barriers, and a plethora of inaccessible institutions – alongside a general reluctance by researchers to unearth realities that might dispel existing assumptions – have led to an overreliance on models and inputs extrapolated from Western manufacturing processes.

The IPCC’s own estimate that solar’s carbon intensity is four times that of wind and nuclear, but 10 times less than gas and 20 times less than coal is derived from such assumptions.

Unsurprisingly, the authors of the IPCC’s sixth assessment report, casually referred to as AR6, base their life cycle assessments (LCA) of solar energy on studies that do not represent the current state of the industry. Of the four studies cited by the authors, two evaluate only European manufacturing of solar panels. The third model is a state-of-the-art Chinese-manufactured panel, the Upgraded Metallurgical Grade Silicon (UMG-Si), which is no longer in production. The fourth reviews 16 studies, all of which either model solar panels that are no longer in production, model panels that make up only a few percentage points of the global market, or employ Ecoinvent’s 1 or 2 inventories, which also use European electricity mixes.

Ecoinvent, the omnipresent database that is relied upon by policymakers and academics across the planet, as well as manufacturers, big and small, was founded by Dr. Rolf Frischknecht.

For over 20 years, his Swiss non-profit, funded at least in part by the Swiss government and the photovoltaic industry, has collected data on the environmental impact of renewable energies. Whether you’re modeling the low-carbon appeal of recycled plastic packaging, automotive filters, or titanium powder, Ecoinvent is the likely source of the data. A recently agreed collaboration on zero-carbon shipping with major players in that industry showcases the association’s still-growing influence.

Since the early 90s, the reputation of Dr. Frischknecht has grown in step with the renewables industry. Some 20 years ago, he began a collaboration with the IEA through the Photovoltaics Power Systems Programme (PVPS), a joint initiative from the IEA and the global PV industry to conduct research on solar and turn it into a global energy “cornerstone”.

Despite his careful stewardship of Ecoinvent, in 2021, Frischknecht quietly resigned from the body he had founded decades earlier. In his resignation letter he noted “irreconcilably different perceptions regarding materiality, reality, quality and accountability” of their latest data.

“There was a drastic shift from (appropriate) data to methodology,” Frischknecht wrote to Environmental Progress. Faced with a movement away from real-world data collection, discussion of what were the crucial data points, proper referencing, and extensive data quality checks, as he had explained in his resignation letter, Frischknecht felt obliged to move on. “During my career, I tried, and try, to be independent of direct, indirect, and subtle attempts to influence the modeling or the data,” he told Environmental Progress.

He then cast doubt on the quality of the Ecoinvent data, telling Environmental Progress, “The PV data in Ecoinvent is from 2011, and there is no data from Chinese information sources.” In email correspondence with Ecoinvent, Environmental Progress was able to confirm Frischknecht’s allegation.

Frischknecht now runs Treeze, a “young and experienced” life cycle assessment consultancy, which is “involved in large EU projects”. Treeze also receives funding from the Swiss Federal Office of Energy and collects life cycle data for the PVPS “Task 12” report on solar’s sustainability.

The total lack of Chinese input into Ecoinvent’s data, however, has not stopped the IEA from continuing to depend on the potentially outdated work of Frischknecht’s brainchild for their own estimates.

These revelations undermine the foundations of the sustainability industry, which bases a significant portion of its certifications on Ecoinvent’s data and promises businesses and governments that earning their certifications protects the planet.

The sector has ample reason to trust Ecoinvent without checking its data. The sustainability sector makes billions of dollars each year thanks to the scale of carbon reductions they claim to provide, and disclosing that it failed to deliver its most basic pledges threatens its business.

Circular Data

For more clarity on why researchers continue to rely on Ecoinvent despite the oversights, Environmental Progress contacted Mariutti’s Twitter sparring partner, Dr. Raugei. He explained that one of the reasons the database has come to prominence was because of how easily the data could be “disaggregated,” allowing for the insertion of custom variables.

While the IEA depends on a range of companies to avoid vested interests gaming the outcomes, Raugei told Environmental Progress that “It’s true that some studies do not use the right variable” and that key papers’ data is out of date, even if more thorough researchers such as Raugei himself “are able to put our own variables in the models to rectify this.”

The problem is that many of these bespoke variables, as in the case of Raugei, are also sourced from the IEA, which once again themselves rely on Ecoinvent data leading to an entirely circular situation.

Contacted again by Environmental Progress, Frischknecht admitted, “It is difficult to get first-hand industrial data, particularly from Asian companies”, but deflected by noting that the PVPS had managed to obtain primary data from at least a couple of commercial entities directly, notably FirstSolar and TotalEnergies. This data, to his mind, confirmed broad researcher assumptions that carbon footprint values between 25 and less than 60 g CO2-eq/kWh were fair.

“I personally see no reason or scientific evidence to change the key figures used to model the LCI and LCA of PV electricity,” he told Environmental Progress by email. “Thus, I cannot support your working hypothesis of (dramatically/vastly) underestimating the lifecycle-based environmental impacts of PV electricity.”

And yet, neither of these companies operates wafer manufacturing facilities in China. FirstSolar even proudly differentiates itself as being unique among the world’s 10 largest solar manufacturers for being the only US-headquartered company and not manufacturing in China.

Frischknecht did, however, offer an intriguing clue to the nature of de Wild-Scholten’s own proprietary data, which Ecoinvent also draws on. “She had access to a larger, confidential set of industry data (major cSi panel, cell and wafer manufacturers),” he wrote.

But even if de Wild-Scholten did have access to such data from China, there is little clarity on whether she included it in Life Cycle Inventories and Life Cycle Assessments of Photovoltaic Systems, the aforementioned highly influential IEA paper that she and Frischknecht worked on together. Here, Environmental Progress’s research may give cause for doubt.

An all-important data point in the carbon footprint assessment of today’s PV production is the energy consumption of silicon purification. It’s a highly energy-intensive process, requiring heat above 1000 degrees Celsius and fuelled by coal. The IEA’s estimate in LCI and LCA of PVs is 49 kW-kg[1]; “suspiciously low,” says Mariutti. But where is the data from? Is it a Chinese industry source from de Wild-Scholten’s secret stash?

The reference given is to yet another IEA report, Trends In Photovoltaic Applications 2019. But here, too, only an estimate is given –49 kW-kg [2] – not a data source, whether Chinese or otherwise. So how did the IEA come up with its figure for solar’s dirtiest and most energy-intensive process?

The IEA Perspective

International Energy Agency’s (IEA) Executive Director Fatih Birol speaks during a session regarding one year of Russia-Ukraine war, at European Parliament, in Brussels, Belgium on March 09, 2023. (Photo by Dursun Aydemir/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)

After a number of lengthy exchanges with Environmental Progress, IEA representatives and collaborators could only offer evasive and not always entirely corroborating answers.

“It’s true that silicon purification is the most energy-intensive stage in PV production,” IEA’s senior energy analyst, Mr Heymi Bahar, told Environmental Progress over the phone. He also accepted that the data point was central to all calculations of solar’s carbon intensity. “But this data is collected anonymously and cannot be shared.”

Pressed by Environmental Progress, Bahar asked, “Why should the IEA share the names of the companies we get the data from?”  To the point that verifying the accuracy of the data, given the huge implications for public expenditure, is important, he added, “Why? Does the fossil fuel industry offer any alternative?” implying there are no better options.

Environmental Progress asked whether the IEA would stand over the unverifiable data in its reports. “We are an umbrella organization,” said Bahar. “We do not oversee the work of all our collaborators. We do not always agree with their opinions.” On whether the IEA trusts that the data it publishes in collaboration is accurate? “Most of the time,” Bahar said.

Two members of the IEA’s solar industry collaboration, PVPS, offered slightly different takes. Daniel Mugnier, PVPS chairman, said that energy consumption data came from “anonymized interviews conducted by Task 12 experts” and that procuring further information would prove overly time-consuming and prevent PVPS from “protecting its sources.” One of those experts, analyst Izumi Kaizuka, told Environmental Progress the information came from a Chinese business association without offering further detail.

Environmental Progress put it to Mugnier and Kaizuka that the only primary data sources available to the PVPS may be the two mentioned by Frischknecht, those without noteworthy links to China: FirstSolar and TotalEnergies. Environmental Progress also asked to know the degree to which the PVPS had relied on assurances from de Wild-Scholten regarding the accuracy of their conclusions without actually being able to consult her proprietary data. At the time of publishing, no response was received.

Presuming the mystery data did come from a Chinese source, Environmental Progress asked Bahar whether this was trustworthy given the vested interest held by both Beijing and the industry it massively subsidizes. He replied that China was “part of the IEA family,” leaving him in no position to comment.

Environmental Progress reached out to Professor Angel de la Vega Navarro of the National Autonomous University of Mexico, who contributed to chapter six of AR6, which focuses on energy systems, and working group III on the mitigation of climate change.

He replied, saying he lacked the expertise to comment further but that the questions we were raising were important. Of the four experts he said were better suited to answer our queries, only one replied, Andrea Hahmann of the Technical University of Denmark: “Unfortunately, I am not knowledgeable enough to provide any comments on the information you have provided as it is outside my area of expertise.”

Environmental Progress contacted Garvin Heath, a contributor to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) and the IEA PVPS report, and received a non-response from the media relations department of his employer, the US National Renewable Energy Laboratory. “Unfortunately, due to current time constraints with our relevant research teams, we will be unable to participate in this.”

Ecoinvent, meanwhile, now headed by Dr. Nikolas Meyer, has not responded to requests for further comment on its lack of Chinese data.

Worryingly, Mariutti claims this is only the tip of the iceberg, with accurate modeling being missed on storage, grid upgrades, methane emissions and more. The IEA has admitted to Environmental Progress that its carbon footprint calculations do not account for three important factors in PV production: silicon mining; toxic panel waste, which promises to overwhelm recycling infrastructure; and something known as the albedo effect. This is when the highly reflective properties of dark-colored solar panels lead to an increase in the greenhouse effect.

According to the IEA, when taken into proper account, the first two factors alone could more than triple the “payback period” for panels, i.e., the length of time before they become carbon neutral after installation.

“Why is the IEA not being transparent about its sources and the gaps in the data?” asks Mariutti. “A hasty transition to solar and other renewables without cast-iron proof of the benefits, all the while handing control to China, could be a huge error.”

With critics like Mariutti being shut out of the debate, science, he says, “is behaving like a religion.” Patrons of the science are giddy bureaucrats charged with convincing taxpayers across the globe to hand over trillions in funding for the feted clean transition.

By seizing control of PV production and acclimatizing well-meaning analysts to the retention of basic data, China has won for itself the lion’s share of global subsidies. What little data may even exist on the sustainability of the PV industry is revealed to selected partners such as the IEA piecemeal and in a manner ensuring its unverifiability.

A picture emerges of an aspirational Western industry captured lock, stock, and barrel by secretive, coal-loving Beijing. It’s a worry for the West’s economic development, never mind energy security and climate action. If solar is anything to go by, the great transition seems less based on data than a mixture of blind faith and vested interests.

Source: Public.substack.com

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The post Solar Panels Are Three Times More Carbon-Intensive Than IPCC Claims appeared first on Energy News Beat.

 

Study: Cost of ‘fueling’ an electric vehicle is equivalent to $17.33 per gallon

Energy News Beat

(The Center Square) – The complete costs of “fueling” an electric vehicle for 10 years are $17.33 per equivalent gallon of gasoline, a new analysis from the Texas Public Policy Foundation says.

The study authors say the $1.21 cost-per-gallon equivalent of charging a car cited by EV advocates excludes the real costs born by taxpayers for subsidies, utility ratepayers for energy investments, and non-electric vehicle owners for mandate-and-environmental-credit-driven higher vehicle costs, which they say total $48,698 per EV. Those costs must be included when comparing fueling costs of EVs and traditional gas-powered vehicles, TPPF maintains.

“The market would be driving towards hybrids if not for this market manipulation from the federal government. We’d be reducing emissions and improving fuel economy at the same time on a much greater scale,” study author Jason Isaac told The Center Square in an interview. He then cited Toyota estimates that the batteries from one EV can power 90 hybrids and reduce emissions 37 times more than that one EV.

The study adds up the costs of direct subsidies to buyers of the car and chargers; indirect subsidies in the form of avoided fuel taxes and fees, as well as electric grid generation, transmission, distribution, and overhead costs for utilities; and regulatory mandates that include fuel economy standards, EPA greenhouse gas credits, and zero-emission mandates.

Image courtesy of the Texas Public Policy Center Texas Public Policy Center

The study also assumes EVs will be driven for 10 years and 120,000 miles, which the authors claim is a generous estimate. According to J.D. Power, EVs lose 2.3% of their range each year due to battery degradation, in part driving EVs to lose value faster than internal combustion cars.

With Ford losing an estimated $70,000 per EV and subsidies reaching $50,000 per EV, Isaac says the real cost of a vehicle such as a Ford Lightning is over $150,000, and those costs are carried by everyone, including non-EV owners and even Americans without cars.

“The real cost of a Ford Lightning is closer to $172,00 and no one would buy them at that. I know their sales have tanked. The [electric] Silverado sold 18 electric trucks last quarter,” Isaac said. “Buying a car is more expensive today and people don’t understand why that is. I’m trying to help them understand if they buy a gas or diesel car they’re paying for an electric vehicle for a wealthy EV owner.”

To reach the $17.73 per gallon equivalent figure, the authors created categories for costs borne by EV owners, taxpayers, utility ratepayers, and buyers of electric vehicles. For reference, the cost per gallon equivalent is computed by dividing the number of miles over a car’s ten year lifetime by the average new vehicle’s fuel efficiency of 36 miles per gallon equivalent, and using that number to divide the total cost presented.

EV owners only pay $1.21 for the cost of residential electricity and $1.38 for charging and metering costs per equivalent gallon, which makes charging still cheaper than gasoline in terms of costs paid by EV owners. However, taxpayers pay $2.72 per gallon in federal and state EV buyer tax credits and rebates ($8,984 over a vehicle lifetime), a cost of $0.40 per gallon ($1,318 over a vehicle lifetime) in avoided charging infrastructure costs split between taxpayers and utility ratepayers. Utility ratepayers then pay $3.18 per gallon ($10,515 over a vehicle lifetime) in increased costs to enable the grid to charge electric vehicles at mass scale through increased power generation, transmission and distribution. Lastly, buyers of non-electric vehicles face increased vehicle costs equating to $1.48 per gallon equivalent ($4,881 over a vehicle lifetime) due to requirements in many states that manufacturers sell a certain number of often money-losing EVs to continue selling other cars, $1.01 per gallon equivalent ($3,322 over a vehicle lifetime) due to EPA GHG emissions standards, while Corporate Average Fuel Economy Credits add a whopping $5.96 per gallon equivalent ($19,678 over a vehicle lifetime).

CAFE standards are the single largest externalized cost of EVs, a cost that researchers attribute to the fact that automakers whose fleets do not meet the necessary average fuel economy must purchase credits from automakers with excess credits, with these credit markets worth billions of dollars per year and contributing $1.78 billion to Tesla’s bottom line in 2022. The average fuel economy of an average EV with a 300 mile range in 2021 was estimated to be 113 miles per gallon equivalent, making automakers strongly incentivized to build these often money-losing cars to meet CAFE goals. To increase the adoption of cars that don’t use diesel or gasoline, the federal government created a 667% multiplier in MPGe for vehicles that use alternative power. With a fleetwide CAFE standard of 37 MPG for 2021 and a 2021 EV rated at 113 MPGE, an EV is worth 507 MPG worth of credits, or more than what Ford loses directly on its EVs.

Source: Newsbreak.com

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The post Study: Cost of ‘fueling’ an electric vehicle is equivalent to $17.33 per gallon appeared first on Energy News Beat.